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et al.: The Fate of ERISA-Qualified Pension Plans Under the Federal Bankr

THE FATE OF ERISA-QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS UNDER
THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE
[In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984)].
INTRODUCTION

Pension plan benefits are an increasingly prominent source of retirement savings for millions of American employees., It is hardly
astonishing, then, that bankruptcy debtors and trustees often argue
over these extensive assets. 2 Litigation concerning debtors' attempts
1. See Hage & Oslund, Pensionfunds: Secure futures or big risks?, Minneapolis Star &

Trib.,Jan. 20, 1985, at ID, col. 1. The increase in the importance of pension funds
began after World War II and was enhanced by the enactment of ERISA. See infra
note 3 and accompanying text. Today, the private pension fund system in the United
States has assets of almost one trillion dollars. Pension funds cover over 50 million
American workers and provide 37% of United States retirement income. Experts
estimate that by the end of the century, private pension plans will cover 70% of all
retirees. Hage & Oslund, supra.
2. See Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: In re Goff-Keogh Plans
and IRAs as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 264 (1984). A great deal of

litigation in the bankruptcy courts involves the issue of whether pension fund proceeds should pass to the bankruptcy trustee or should be exempt or excluded and,
therefore, kept out of the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Miller v.Jones (In re Jones), 43
Bankr. 1002 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (ERISA plan not a spendthrift trust and thus included
in bankruptcy estate); SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Bizon, 42 Bankr. 338 (D.
Md. 1984) (civil service retirement benefits due to debtor not part of bankruptcy
estate); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr. 893 (D.S.C. 1984) (despite anti-alienation clauses, ERISA plan was not spendthrift trust and, therefore, was included in bankruptcy estate);
Hovis v. Wright (In re Wright), 39 Bankr. 623 (D.S.C. 1983) (debtor's contributions
to state retirement system were property of estate under Bankruptcy Code);
Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982) (beneficial interest in an ERISA-qualified plan excluded from bankruptcy estate); Rodgers
v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) (debtor's vested
interest in ERISA-qualified profit-sharing plan property of estate); Miller v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1984) (ERISAqualified plan was part of bankruptcy estate); Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank (In re
Kwaak), 42 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (pension plan analogous to spendthrift
trust and, therefore, excluded); American Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 42 Bankr.
553 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1984) (non-assignability provisions did not exclude deferred
compensation plan from bankruptcy estate); Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42
Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1984) (ERISA-qualified plan excluded because not attached by creditor or bankruptcy trustee); In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842 (Bankr E.D.
Mich. 1984) (funds from ERISA-qualified plans were property of bankruptcy estate);
In re Peeler, 37 Bankr. 517 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (funds from deferred compensation plan not beyond debtor's control when bankruptcy petition was filed were included in bankruptcy estate); In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983)
(savings portion of ERISA plan not excluded where debtor had present fight to reach
1045
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to keep pension plan funds qualifying under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)3 out of the bankruptcy
estate has been increasing.4 This trend will undoubtedly continue as
it); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio

1983) (interest in profit-sharing pension plan not included where anti-alienation language precluded access by general creditors); In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1983) (although pension plan payments were not currently needed for
debtor's support, they could be claimed as exempt in light of debtor's impending
retirement needs); Shults v. Rose's Stores, Inc. (In re Holt), 32 Bankr. 767 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1983) (funds contributed toward pension fund excluded from estate).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1 144
and scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code). Pension and profit-sharing
plans come in many varieties, but almost all of them meet ERISA-qualifying requirements. Although a wide range of styles exist, plans can be grouped for the purposes
of this Comment into four general categories. The first category is the traditional
defined-benefit pension plan, which provides for a guaranteed benefit after retirement, and is usually connected to some portion or percentage of the worker's salary.
See Hage & Oslund, supra note 1, at ID, cols. 1-2. The second category is the definedcontribution plan which simply operates to provide certain contributions to a special
retirement account during the employee's stay with the employer. See id. at 3D, col. 1
(detailed comparison of defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans). The third
category of retirement fund, the Keogh plan, is limited to use by self-employed persons and, therefore, is usually controlled and administered by the self-employed individual. See Pulles, ERISA Plans in Bankruptcy, HENNEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 19,
21 nn. 1-3. Keogh plans are established pursuant to the Keogh-Smathers Act, Pub. L.
No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code). For a detailed discussion of Keogh plans, see Rayndon & Anderson, Attachment of Keogh Plan Assets-A Confusion in the Law and the Courts, 61 TAXES 525 (1983);
see also Self Employed Retirement Plans, FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2D (IRA) § H8000. Fi-

nally, there are individual retirement accounts (IRAs). IRAs are available to all individuals including those already participating in other ERISA-qualified plans, and are
in widespread use. For a more detailed discussion of IRAs, see Individual Retirement
Arrangements, 355 TAX MGmrT. (BNA) A-I. For a general discussion of ERISA-regulated pension plans, see Soble, Eggertsen & Bernstein, Pension-RelatedClaims in Bankruptcy, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155 (1982).

For a detailed analysis of pension plan

qualification and tax consequences, see generally Employee Plans-Reportingand Disclosure Requirements, 361 TAX. MGMT. (BNA) A-i; (ERISA)-Qualified Plans-Deductions,
Contributionsand Funding,313 TAX. MGMT. (BNA) A- 1; Pension Plans-Qualifications,351
TAX. MGMT. (BNA) A-1.

4. Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 2, at 264. "[T]he volume of litigation over a
debtor's right to keep an ERISA pension plan despite the filing of a liquidation petition appears to be increasing at a rapid rate and is likely to continue to increase in the
future as these pension funds grow." Id. When ERISA was enacted it was generally
recognized that the legislation would give rise to a substantial amount of litigation.
Cook, Current Developments in Litigation Under ERISA, PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITs-ANNUAL REVIEW 2D 1 (1980).

Cook stated in his article that:

one of the fundamental goals of ERISA was to facilitate individual access to
the federal courts for the vindication of rights under employee plans and to
provide a mechanism for the Department of Labor to initiate litigation to
protect the rights of participants and beneficiaries. Now, as the fifth anniversary of ERISA has passed, it comes as no surprise that the anticipated
wave of litigation is a reality.
Id. One reason for the recent growth in pension plan-bankruptcy litigation may be
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pension plans remain attractive to both employers and employees.5
Despite the fact that a bankruptcy estate includes all of a debtor's
property, 6 debtors argue that their interests in ERISA pension funds
should be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. In re Graham,7 a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, involved such an argument. The Graham court held that such clauses restricting the
assignment or alienation of fund proceeds, required for ERISA
plans, do not keep the fund assets from becoming part of the bankruptcy estate.8 Thus, a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified plan
was held to be part of the bankruptcy estate that would eventually be
distributed among his or her creditors.9
The significance of Graham stems from the Eighth Circuit's decision that bankruptcy law controls the status of pension funds for
which ERISA provides a seemingly clear exemption. The court refused to accept the debtor's argument that pension fund proceeds
are exempt from the bankruptcy estate because they are restricted
from assignment and alienation under ERISA,lO and are thus enthat there was a short time-lag involved after the enactment of ERISA in 1974 and
the new Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in addition to the new manner of determining the bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code. The new Act became effective
on October 1, 1979, and as a result, the past several years have seen the beginning of
a trend toward more litigation in this area. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5. A factor contributing to the continued importance of these types of pension
plans is the tax advantage afforded to both employees and employers through participation in a qualified plan. Pension plans are attractive devices for compensating employees for their services because of the tremendous tax breaks. The tax advantages
alone are usually sufficient incentive for an employer to establish a pension plan.
Contributions to a qualified plan are deductible from the employer's gross income.
I.R.C. § 404 (1982). The employee, however, will not have any recognizable taxable
income until the benefits of the plan are actually received. Id., subd. (a). In addition,
any interest earned on the contributed funds accumulates tax free. Id. § 501(a); see
supra note 3 and accompanying text. The tax consequences of pension plans, including defined-benefit, defined-contribution, Keogh plans, and IRAs were affected by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
For a detailed discussion of the tax consequences for pension plans under these acts,
see Pingree & Goulding, Pension Provisions of the Tax Equity and FiscalResponsibility Act of
1982, 60 TAXES 795 (1982).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 54 1(a) (1982). The Code defines the bankruptcy estate as the
equitable estate created and held by the bankruptcy trustee at the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings for future distribution among creditors.
7. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
8. Id. at 1273.
9. Id.
10. In Graham, the debtor's pension plan was ERISA-qualified. Id. at 1269. In
order to be qualified under ERISA, the pension plan must contain restrictive antialienation and anti-assignment language. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1); see also infra
note 75 and accompanying text.
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forceable against creditors under nonbankruptcy law.I l This holding appears to be contrary to the facial language of the Bankruptcy
Code.12 The court also rejected the debtor's alternative argument
that his interest in the fund should not be included in the bankruptcy
estate since it was property which is specifically exempted under federal law.' 5 The court's rejection of these arguments parallels similar
4
decisions made in other federal courts throughout the country.'
The Graham decision does not reflect the basic intent and purpose
of the bankruptcy laws.'5 Under Graham, debtors may be left with
the unenviable task of beginning to save for their retirement all over
again. Particularly for the self-employed, this task may be difficult if
not impossible. 16
11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). That provision states, "A restriction on the transfer of
a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." Id. The Graham court
held that this language was applicable only to preserve the status of spendthrift trusts
under state law. See Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271; see also infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
12. One commentator suggests that the Graham court erred in not construing the
statute on its face. The Graham court instead resorted to the legislative history in
analyzing the Bankruptcy Code. See Pulles, supra note 3, at 19.
[U]nder non-bankruptcy law debtors can shield a substantial amount of
money in ERISA qualified plans. Thus, many courts have engineered an
ambiguity in the words 'applicable non-bankruptcy law,' enabling them to
resort to legislative history. The legislative history indicates that, by the use
of the phrase 'applicable non-bankruptcy law', Congress intended to keep
only traditional spendthrift trusts out of bankruptcy, not all ERISA-qualified
plans. A substantial portion of ERISA-qualified plans, including all Keogh
and IRA plans, will not constitute valid spendthrift trusts under traditional
state spendthrift trust law . . . . Through this recourse to the legislative
history many bankruptcy and district courts have found happiness in snaring
many ERISA-qualified plan assets for the bankruptcy estate. In doing so
they have done an injustice to the plain meaning of the statute and to the
Congressional intent behind ERISA.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see infra note 128.
13. See 726 F.2d at 1273-74; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (allowing an individual
debtor to exempt from the estate "any property that is exempt under Federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the
date of filing of the petition").
14. See, e.g., In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983) (Keogh plan assumed to be
part of the estate); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (ERISA-qualified Keogh
plan benefits not exempt); Shackelford, 27 Bankr. 372 (IRA was property of the estate);
Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449 (Keogh plan part of estate assets); Lowe, 25 Bankr. 86 (retirement annuity included in assets of estate); Klayer, 20 Bankr. 270 (beneficial interest in
retirement trust not exempt asset); Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (interest in ERISA-qualifled cooperative investment plan not insulated from bankruptcy trustee).
15. One of the basic purposes of the bankruptcy statutes is to provide the debtor
with a fresh start in life without debt. See infra note 19.
16. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNIK, BANKRUPTCY LAw MANUAL § 4.03[8] (Supp. II
1984). Although courts do take various factors into account when assessing the
needs of the debtor for purposes of a fresh start, see, e.g., In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr.
677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (under Code's exemption provisions for pension funds,
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This Comment discusses Graham and the reasoning relied upon by
the Eighth Circuit in allowing ERISA-qualified pension plans to become part of the bankruptcy estate. First, the Comment examines
the history of the prior Bankruptcy Act17 and the new Bankruptcy
Code.18 Second, it reviews decisions by bankruptcy and federal
courts which have failed to exempt ERISA-qualified pension funds
from the bankruptcy estate, particularly the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Graham. Finally, the Comment focuses attention on Graham's
effects on future bankruptcy cases, and examines the anomaly of the
court's resort to legislative interpretation when confronted with a
facially clear statute.
I.

FROM THE ACT TO THE CODE: BANKRUPTCY LAw HISTORY

The primary purposes and general rules of the bankruptcy laws
have remained basically unchanged since the enactment of the country's first comprehensive national bankruptcy statute, the National
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.19 Important procedural changes, however,
special need for retired, infirm, or elderly debtors should be considered), in most
instances funds which the debtor has worked hard to save for his or her old age will
pass to the estate. See, e.g., In re Kochell, 31 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc.), af'd, 732
F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1982) (factors used to determine the extent to which retirement
plan is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor include age, health, future
earnings, and necessary expenditures). In Kochell, the debtor was a middle-aged doctor who had made contributions to his pension plans for five years. The court held
that it was impossible to consider that the pension funds could be deemed necessary
for the support of the debtor. Id. at 141.
17. See infra note 22.
18. See infra note 20.
19. 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Act, with periodic changes, governed bankruptcy
law for approximately 80 years and.is still significant. It remains the law for cases
commencing before September 30, 1979, and many precedents set under the Act
remain influential under the Code. The Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1011501). For a brief history of the development of bankruptcy laws in the United
States, see 1 W.

NORTON JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE

§§ 1.0 1-.03

(1981).
An intrinsic purpose of bankruptcy law is to give the debtor a chance at a fresh
start in life without creditor harassment. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648
(1971) (basic purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to give certain debtors a fresh start).
Bankruptcy laws are no longer used primarily to punish insolvents who may have
made some mistakes. See Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1945). Instead, the laws are intended to release and rehabilitate the debtor and allow him or
her to start anew. Id. Public policy looks beyond the debtor to his or her family, and
regards reasonable protection of that family as a greater concern than the full payment of debts. Id. In keeping with these policy considerations, certain property of
the debtor can be treated as exempt. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). The goals of the
exemption provisions are: (1) to protect the debtor from abject poverty, (2) to assist
and encourage the debtor on the road to recovery through a fresh start, and (3) to
shift the burden of the welfare of the debtor and his or her family from society as a
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have been made in recent years. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
197820 represents a thorough revision and reform of bankruptcy law,
practice, and procedure, and is the first major revision of the bank21
ruptcy laws in the last forty years.
A.

The Former Law.: Transferability and Leviability

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the property of a bankruptcy
estate was defined in terms of its transferability or leviability.22
whole to the creditors who dealt with the debtor and contributed to his economic
demise. In re Merwin, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 17, 18 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1978).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501).
On November 6, 1978, President Carter signed into law HR 8200, unofficially known
as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Act became effective on October 1, 1979
and is divided into four titles. The most important of these is Title I, which contains
the Bankruptcy Code. That title contains the substantive and procedural law for
bankruptcy liquidation and rehabilitation cases, although much of the procedural material is actually contained in the bankruptcy rules. For detailed information tracing
the development of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, see Forman, The Bankruptcy Reform
Act, PA. B. Ass'N Q.,July 1979, at 168; W. NORTON, supra note 19, §§ 3.01-.05. For an
overview of the changes which the new statute created in bankruptcy law, see Patrick
& Meyer, An Overview of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1 Bankr. 1 (1980).
21. See Forman, supra note 20, at 168. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is the
first major change in United States bankruptcy law since the Chandler Act of 1938.
One commentator has suggested that the change was long overdue:
The need for revision and reform developed over a number of years. The
reasons included: the rising tide of consumer bankruptcies after World War
II, which placed a severe strain on the current bankruptcy system; an increase in the costs of operation of the bankruptcy system particularly in nonbusiness cases, which produced little or no benefit to creditors; a growing
awareness that the adversary process is inappropriate for this kind of nonbusiness proceeding; and a singular lack of uniformity in the application of
the bankruptcy laws throughout the country. In addition the promulgation
of the rules of bankruptcy procedure, although a significant advance, created confusion with respect to the remaining substantive provisions of the
statute unaffected by the rules. The substantive law and the court system
both needed updating to meet the demands of the larger and more complicated business cases. Substantial changes in the law in other fields occurred
and deficiencies in the reorganization Chapters surfaced, all of which were
hampering the efficient operation of the rehabilitation process and called for
modernization.
Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1976). Section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act included "property, including rights of action which prior to the filing of the petition
[the bankrupt] could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied
upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded,
or sequestered." Under the old Act, any property held by the debtor in trust belonged to the beneficiary and never became a part of the bankruptcy estate under
§ 70. See In re Wyatt, 6 Bankr. 947, 952 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); see also In re Franklin
Say. & Loan Co., 34 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tenn. 1940); 4A L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPCY § 70.25(2) (14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. However, under
the new Bankruptcy Code, the initiation of a "bankruptcy case creates an estate
which, pursuant to § 541(a)(1) consists of 'all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in the property.' " See Wyatt, 6 Bankr. at 953 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
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Utilizing this standard, a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust or similar future interest was excluded from the bankruptcy estate at the
outset of the proceedings if it could not be transferred or levied
upon under the laws of the debtor's state of domicile.23
Section 7 0(a) of the Act24 applied a two-prong test to determine
the status of exempt property. First, the court was to inquire
whether the property could have been transferred by the bankrupt
on the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.25 Second, the
court was to consider whether the property could have been levied
upon and sold through judicial process or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered. 26 If either of these conditions were satisfied, the property was not exempt and could pass to the bankruptcy
27
estate.
Under this transferability-leviability standard,28 state law was generally controlling. 2 9 Retirement benefits authorized under federal
23. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916) (trust fund
established by will did not pass to trustee because general creditors could not reach it
under Massachusetts law); Stokes v. Trust Co. (In re McLaughlin), 507 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1975) (rights received by debtor pursuant to a support trust created by father's
will did not pass to bankruptcy trustee because such rights were not subject to transfer or levy under Georgia law); Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1975) (bankrupt's interest in a spendthrift trust was
exempt from estate to extent recognized by California law).

24. 11 U.S.C. §

I10(a) (repealed 1978).

25. See 4A COLLIER, supra note 22, § 70.15(2).
26. Id This two-prong test "is simple and easily applied." Gillaspy v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 109 Miss. 136, 67 So. 904 (1915). Section 70(a)(5)
"covers 'any interest in the property the bankrupt may have had, however minute,
that was subject to transfer by him or levy and sale by judicial process' or other
seizure or sequestration." 4A COLLIER, supra note 22, § 70.15(2), at 143.
27. 4A COLLIER, supra note 22, § 70.15(2), at 137. Generally, it is not necessary
that both prongs of the test be satisfied in order for the debtor's property to pass to
the bankruptcy estate. Thus, if the property at issue is transferable, it is not
mandatory that it also be subject to levy or sale. See, e.g., Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N.C.
454, 460, 163 S.E. 572, 575 (1932) (if property could have been transferred, it is
immaterial whether or not it could have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process). Naturally, the converse is also true that if the property is subject to levy or
sale, but is not necessarily transferable, it also lapses to the bankruptcy estate. See
Gillaspy, 109 Miss. 136, 67 So. 904.
28. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
29. 4A COLLIER, supra note 22, § 70.22(2), at 298. Pensions payable to state or
municipal officers or employees on retirement are usually deemed to be rewards for
public service rather than property rights, and when not leviable or transferable they
do not pass to the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 298-99. But see Ferwerda v. Zievers (In re
Ferwerda), 424 F.2d 1131, 1133 (7th Cir. 1970), in which the debtor, a physician,
argued that assets deposited by him in an American Medical Association (AMA) retirement fund were exempt under provisions of Wisconsin law which provided an
exemption for assets in an employee's trust. The court held that the doctor was not
an "employee" pursuant to the Wisconsin statute and denied the exemption. This
holding was in spite of the fact that the AMA plan had been established pursuant to
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law, however, were occasionally rendered immune from the bankruptcy estate by federal statutes or regulations which preempted
state provisions.30 Under section 70(a)(5),31 all property specified in
that section which was not exempt passed to the trustee as a matter
of law.32 Nevertheless, in interpreting the scope of the exemption

under section 70(a), the courts found it nearly impossible to categorically define "property" for exemption purposes.33
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the scope of the term
"property" under section 70(a) was to be determined with reference
to the distinctive purposes of the Act.34 The Supreme Court held

that courts must look to the policies of the bankruptcy laws to determine on an ad hoc basis whether the bankrupt's property interest
should pass to the estate.3 5
the Keogh-Smathers Act, see supra note 3, which allowed self-employed individuals to
be treated as "employees." Ferwerda, 424 F.2d at 1133.
30. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944) (sustaining federal regulations governing the TVA Retirement System against trustee's
claim that debtor's interest was vulnerable under state law as a spendthrift trust created by the debtor). But see Ferwerda, 424 F.2d at 1133 (court disallowed federal definition of employee in favor of state law interpretation).
31. Under § 70(a) of the old Act, exempt property constituted a separate class of
property from that which passed to the bankruptcy trustee. The exempt property did
not expressly pass to the estate under this section. Section 70 also provided that the
trustee of the estate would be vested with title to all the bankrupt's property except
that which had been adjudicated exempt. 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 541.02[3] (15th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]; see infra
note 46.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). Under § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, exemptions specified by state law are preserved in bankruptcy for the benefit of residents of the respective states. In applying these exemptions, courts are bound to follow the
decisions of the state courts. See, e.g., Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661
(5th Cir. 1981) (where no other provision is contained in a federal statute dealing
with exemptions, state law governs under § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act).
33. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). "[Iln interpreting
[§ 70(a)(5)], '[i]t is impossible to give any categorical definition to the word 'property,' nor can we attach to it in certain relations the limitations which would be attached to it in others.' " Id. (quoting Fisher v. Cushman, 103 F. 860, 864 (1st Cir.
1900)).
34. Id.; see also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) (income tax refund is
property of the estate under § 70(a)(5) because it is sufficiently rooted in the bankruptcy past and not conceptually related to future wages necessary for debtor's fresh
start). But see Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (accrued but unpaid vacation pay
was not property of estate where the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to give debtor
a new purpose in life and a clear field for future effort); see also infra note 46.
35. See Segal, 382 U.S. at 379; see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31,
§ 541.02[1]. In analyzing Segal, it has been stated that:
while future wages or expected bequests might be transferable under
nonbankruptcy law, they would nonetheless not be called property within
the meaning of the [old] Bankruptcy Act. The reason given [by the Segal
court] was that to allow the trustee to take them would defeat the fresh start
policy embodied, in part, in the bankruptcy discharge.
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The primary objective of section 70(a)(5) was "to secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or
leviable form when he files his petition."36 In recognition of the conflicting fresh start doctrine,37 however, a third prong was added to
the two-part test of section 70(a). Once the transferability-leviability
test had been satisfied, the property would pass to the bankruptcy
estate only if the purposes of the bankruptcy laws were served by
including that property within the estate.3 8
In order to narrow this difficult rule, the Supreme Court, in Segal v.
Rochelle,39 ruled that a disputed property interest was to be considered the property of the estate if it was "sufficiently rooted in the
pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start." 4 0 Despite this attempted
standardization, courts continue to disagree on cases with seemingly
similar fact situations.41
B.

The New Code.: The All-inclusive Standard

The enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197842 and the
establishment of the Bankruptcy Code43 have provided significant
procedural changes for exempt property that have affected the manner in which courts decide bankruptcy cases. 4 4 The most prominent
Id.
36. Segal, 382 U.S. at 379. The court went on to declare:
To this end the term 'property' has been construed most generously and an
interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because
enjoyment must be postponed. However, limitations on the term do grow
out of other purposes of the Act; one purpose which is highly prominent
and is relevant in this case is to leave the bankrupt free after the date of his
petition to accumulate new wealth in the future.
Id. at 541-42 (citations omitted).
37. See supra note 19.
38. See Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 2, at 265.
39. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
40. Id. at 380. Along these lines, the Supreme Court reasoned that future interests, which were designed to function as a wage substitute after retirement and were
primarily to support the basic requirements of life for the debtor and his or her family, would not pass to the estate. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 648.
41. Compare Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1981)
(debtor's interest in two trusts provided for retirement purposes did not pass to the
estate) and In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975) (trustee had no claim to
retirement benefits of the debtor) and Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker),
473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (contributions to ERISA-qualified plan not property of the estate) with In re Baviello, 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (antialienation clauses of ERISA fund did not preclude passage of funds to estate).
42. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501);
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
43. This refers to Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1501; see supra note 20.
44. See supra note 22; see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31,
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change under the Code is the manner in which property of a debtor
is transferred to the bankruptcy estate. Under the Code, all property
of the debtor vests immediately in the estate upon the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.45 This change from the Bankruptcy Act is
significant.46
Once a debtor's property vests in the estate, the debtor is permitted to claim certain exemptions under section 522.47 This is a sub-

stantial change from section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, in which
exempt items constituted a separate and distinct class of property
which never passed to the estate. 48 Under the Code, the debtor has
the option of electing to take the federal bankruptcy exemptions or
the exemptions provided under federal or state nonbankruptcy
9

law.4

§ 541.02[1]. Under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, nonbankruptcy law determines
whether the debtor has any legal or equitable interest in the property which he is
seeking to exempt. Id. at 541-10 to 541-11. Unlike § 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act,
it is no longer necessary to determine whether nonbankruptcy law permits the debtor
to transfer his or her property or whether his or her creditors may reach it. Id. at
541-11. Although the debtor's interest in an item will be determined by nonbankruptcy law, the question of what constitutes property within the meaning of § 541
apparently remains a federal question. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
367-69 (1977); see also In re Cox Cotton Co., 3 COLLIER BANiuR. CAS. 2D (MB) 615,
623 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980), afd, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981) (while the interest of
the debtor in property is determined by state law, the question of whether such property is part of the estate is a federal question).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). One court, quoting the House Report, stated:
The sweeping scope of this automatic inclusion was intended to remedy
much of the old Act's perceived deficiencies: '[The Act was] a complicated
melange of references to state law, and [did] little to further the bankruptcy
policy of distribution of the debtor's property to his creditor in satisfaction
of his debts.'
Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1977)).
46. Explaining the broadened scope of § 541 of the new Code over § 70(a) of the
old Act, Senate Report 989 stated that the new law "has the effect of overruling Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903) because it includes as property of the
estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it ....
" S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1977); see Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 83-84 (2d
Cir. 1982) (the substantial departure of § 541 from the old Act reflects a congressional intent to include all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start).
The Report concluded that § 4 overrules Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1977); see supra note 34.
47. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), (d) (1982).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982); see In re Meyers, 2 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980). The Meyers court observed-the difference between the old and the new law:
Under pre-Code law, a bankrupt was able to claim as exempt, property
which was allowable as exempt by federal law or by state law. § 6 of the
Bankruptcy Act. . . . The Code takes a different approach. It contains its
own exemption provisions, (§ 522(d)) but gives the debtor the option of
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Section 541: Exclusion Provisions

Section 541 of the Code created a new procedure for determining
the property of the bankruptcy estate. All property of the debtor is
now immediately placed in the bankruptcy estate under control of
the trustee. 5 0 This section significantly limits the dependence of the
Bankruptcy Code on state and federal nonbankruptcy law.51 Under
section 541, the filing of a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates an
estate comprised of "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case." 52 The legislative history of section 541 indicates Congress' intent that the bankruptcy
estate be all-inclusive.53
Paragraph c of section 541 is illustrative of that section's broad
coverage. Paragraph c provides that restrictions on the transfer of
the debtor's interest in property will not preclude it from being included in the estate. 54 Subparagraph 2, on the other hand, provides
that a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law is enforceable in a case under this title."55
Under the broad definition of section 541 (a) (1), even spendthrift
trusts, 56 which were excluded from the estate under the Bankruptcy
Act,5 7 would pass to the bankruptcy estate.5 8 The legislative history
electing to take the federal exemptions provided under federal non-bankruptcy law and state law.
Id. at 604 n. 1.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
51. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, § 541.02[1].
52. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
53. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978). The Senate Report states:
The scope of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible and intangible property, causes of action ... and all other
forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act
... [I]t includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even
that needed for a fresh start.
Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-69 (1978).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 541(c)(2).
56. A spendthrift trust is generally defined as a trust in which the interest of the
beneficiary cannot be assigned or reached by creditors. The primary objective of
such a trust, however, is to protect the beneficiary from his own folly, inefficiency, or
misfortune. II A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 151, at 1131 (3d ed. 1967).
57. It was generally recognized that spendthrift trusts were exempt under § 70(a)
because they were neither transferable nor leviable. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1975). Thus, regardless
of state law or recognized exceptions to the contrary, the interest in spendthrift trusts
would not pass to bankruptcy estates. First Northwestern Trust Co. v. IRS, 622 F.2d
387 (8th Cir. 1980). The problem is that there is a general conflict among states as to
the validity of the spendthrift trusts themselves and as to what constitutes a spend-
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of section 541(c)(2), however, indicates that Congress intended to
preserve the status which spendthrift trusts enjoyed under the Bankruptcy Act. 59 In its analysis of section 541, the Senate Report states,
"Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) preserves the restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent the restriction is enforceable
under nonbankruptcy law." 60
2. Section 522: Exemption Provisions
In addition to the exclusions established in section 541(c)(2), another Code section applicable to pension plans contains exemption
provisions. Section 52261 represents another significant change
from the former Bankruptcy Act. Section 522 allows an individual
debtor to choose between the exemptions permitted by the law of his
or her state of domicile and by federal nonbankruptcy law, or the
newly created exemptions established by the Bankruptcy Code.62
The debtor who chooses state and federal nonbankruptcy exempthrift trust. See G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 40, at 151-54 (5th
ed. 1973); II A. ScoTr, supra note 56, § 151.
58. In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress was concerned about conditional
transfers and their possible effect on the bankruptcy estate. For example, a transferor could condition his transfer such that if the transferee became involved in bankruptcy proceedings, title in the property would revert to the transferee. To resolve
this problem, § 541 was enacted to include all property interests in the bankruptcy
estate regardless of prior conditions. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 16,
§ 4.03[7]. The exception to this rule lies in § 541(c)(2).
59. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5869.
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the
debtor, in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property of the estate. The provisions invalidated are those that restrict or condition transfer of the debtor's interest, and those that are
conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a bankruptcy case, or on the appointment of a custodian
of the debtor's property. Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust that the restriction is
enforceable nonbankruptcy law to the extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his dependents.
Id.
60. Id. This is precisely the status which spendthrift trusts had enjoyed under the
Bankruptcy Act.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
62. Id., subd. (b). The insolvent debtor may choose between the federal exemptions of § 522 or a combination of state law or federal nonbankruptcy provisions. In
Minnesota, for example, the bankrupt's choice under § 522 may be largely influenced
by the amount of equity he or she has in his or her homestead. Because the state has
a liberal homestead exemption, see MINN. STAT. ch. 510 (1984), the Minnesota debtor
will choose the state and nonbankruptcy federal exemptions if he or she has substantial equity in his or her home. Pulles, supra note 3, at 24-25. For a more detailed
examination of the § 522 provisions, see Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act:
The Development of its StructuralProvisionsand Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 329-34 (1978).
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tions is entitled to keep any property that is exempt under federal
statutes other than the Bankruptcy Code.63 The debtor may also
keep any property that is exempt under state or local law in his or
her place of domicile at the time of the petition. 64 Finally, the debtor
may exempt an interest in property as a tenant by the entirety or as a
joint tenant if he or she chooses this method. 65 In the alternative,
the debtor may take advantage of the specific federal exemptions set
out in the Bankruptcy Code.66 In most instances, the Code exemp63. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). Exemptions under federal nonbankruptcy statutes
are generally limited in scope. Most relate to monetary benefits and pensions. Exemptions include benefits paid under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407; the
Veteran's Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 3101; and retirement benefits paid to employees of the United States Civil Service, 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). State exemptions vary widely across the nation
and from region to region due to a variety of historical and political factors. See B.
WErIRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 16, § 4.07[l][b]. The Minnesota exemption
statute, for example, lists specific types of property not subject to attachment, garnishment, or sale. See MINN. STAT. § 550.37. These include: the family bible; a burial
plot; basic personal items such as clothing and household items (but not exceeding a
certain amount, adjusted biannually for inflation); farm equipment or other tools of
trade or business not exceeding $5000; property used in education open to the public; money from damage claims on other exempt property; insurance proceeds for the
death of a spouse not exceeding $20,000; benefit payments from police or firefighters' associations; a manufactured home; a motor vehicle not exceeding $2,000 in
value; wages not subject to garnishment; relief or welfare payments; earnings of a
minor child of the debtor; civil causes of action for injuries or death; and aggregate
interest not exceeding $4000 in life insurance contracts. Id. Subdivision 24 sets out
the exemption for pension plans:
Subd. 24. Employee Benefits. The debtor's right to receive a payment, or payments received by the debtor, under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing,
annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death,
age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessaryfor the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor.

Id. (emphasis added). Subdivision 24 is very similar to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). See
infra note 66 (text of § 522(d)(10)(E)).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B).
66. See Id. § 522(d). These include: the debtor's aggregate interest in real property not exceeding $7500; interest in a motor vehicle not exceeding $1200; debtor's
interest in personal and household items not exceeding $200; interest in tools of the
debtor's trade or business not exceeding $700; an unmatured life insurance contract;
professionally prescribed health aids; the debtor's right to receive payments for civil
damages, life insurance proceeds, or awards under crime victims reparation laws. Id
The subsection applicable to pension plans, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), reads:
(10) The Debtor's right to receive(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length
of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any

dependent of the debtor, unless(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an
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tions are more generous than those of the states, 6 7 and include those
things necessary for the debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy.68
Thus, the federal exemptions remain in harmony with the general
policies of the bankruptcy laws.
II.

IN RE GRAHAM

Graham,69

the debtor filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7.
In In re
Graham, a physician, was the sole shareholder, director, and officer
of a professional corporation. The corporation had previously
formed a pension and profit-sharing trust under ERISA.70 Graham
was the trustee and primary beneficiary of that plan at the time he
filed his petition.71
The trust qualified as tax exempt under the appropriate provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code,72 and received contributions from the
corporation based on the net corporate profits of the previous fiscal
year.7 3 Graham's fully vested and accrued benefits under the plan
were $150,000, attributable to corporate contributions made on his
behalf.74 A written plan governed the administration of the trust
fund. The plan provided that benefits accruing pursuant to it could
7
not be assigned or alienated by its beneficiary. 5
insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such
contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify [as an exempt pension,
profit-sharing, stock bonus, or annuity plan under the Internal Revenue
Code].
Id. (emphasis added). A debtor may not utilize the federal exemptions if his or her
state of domicile has vetoed the debtor's option to choose federal exemptions in
§ 522(d). Thirty-seven states have enacted legislation prohibiting debtors from
electing the federal exemptions provided by § 522(d). For a list of these states, see 3
COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCy, supra note 31, § 522.02, at 522-12 n.4a. For a more detailed discussion of the § 522 opt-out clause, see Haines, Section 522's Opt-out Clause:
Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1.
67. Although this is not always the case, it is generally true. For a detailed discussion of the eleven federal exemptions under § 522(d), see B. WEINTRAUB & A.
RESNICK, supra note 16, § 4.07[2].

68. See supra note 64.
69. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 1269.
71. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 304, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Iowa
1982). The only other employee, Ryan, retired before Graham filed for bankruptcy.
The advisory committee for Graham's ERISA plan decided at that time to hold his
benefits in trust until he reached age 65. 726 F.2d at 1270. Graham was the sole
member of the committee. Id.
72. The retirement plan qualified as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 401(a). 726 F.2d
at 1269.
73. 24 Bankr. at 307.
74. 726 F.2d at 1269.
75. 24 Bankr. at 307. This prohibition on assignment and alienation is required
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Graham terminated his employment with the corporation on the
same day that he filed his chapter 7 petition. 76 He subsequently resigned his positions as officer and director of the corporation. The
7
bankruptcy trustee was elected sole director of the corporation.7
The trustee then commenced an action against Graham in Graham's
capacity as trustee of the corporation's ERISA plan. The trustee requested that the bankruptcy court order that the entire amount of
the debtor's accrued benefits in the plan be turned over to the bankruptcy estate. 78 The bankruptcy court held Graham's interest in the
funds nonexempt, and ordered him to turn the entire amount over
to the bankruptcy trustee. 79
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the bankrupt's vested interest in the benefits of the ERISA-qualified pension
trust were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.8 0 The court also
by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), and the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401(a), in
order to qualify the pension plan as tax exempt. The written plan agreement pro-

vided that a participant's nonforfeitable accrued benefits would be distributed by one
or more of three methods: as a life annuity income, as fixed period installments, or
as a lump sum payment. In addition, the plan provided that distribution would begin
not later than the 60th day after the close of the plan year in which the beneficiary
reached age 65, or terminated services with the employer. 726 F.2d at 1269. If a
participant in the plan terminated his employment with the corporation prior to
reaching normal retirement age, it was within the sole discretion of the advisory committee whether to commence distribution of the benefits to the participant at the
close of the plan year or to wait until he or she reached age 65. Id. Paragraph 5.03 of
the written plan reads as follows:
5.03 TERMINATION OF SERVICE PRIOR TO NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE: Upon termination of a participant's employment prior to attaining Normal Retirement Age (for any reason other than death or
disability), The Advisory Committee, in its sole discretion, may direct the
Trustee to pay the Participant his nonforfeitable Accrued Benefit. The Advisory Committee must give its direction to the Trustee within ninety (90)
days of the Participant's Termination of Employment . . . If the Advisory

Committee does not give the Trustee a direction to distribute, the Trustee
shall continue to hold the Participant's Accrued Benefit in trust until the
close of the Plan Year in which the Participant attains Normal Retirement
Age, at which time the Trustee shall commence distribution of the Participant's nonforfeitable Accrued Benefit.
24 Bankr. at 307. The written plan defined the advisory committee as the corporation's board of directors. Graham, as the sole director, thus constituted the advisory
committee. Three days prior to the filing of Graham's bankruptcy petition, the discretionary distribution provision of 5.03 of the written plan was amended by a special meeting of the board of directors. This amendment provided that benefits under
the plan were not payable to the participant unless he or she was either totally disabled or until he or she reached 65 years of age. 726 F.2d at 1269-70.
76. 726 F.2d at 1270.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1273-74. In analyzing the legislative intent, the court stated, "There is
no indication whatever that Congress intended § 541(c)(2) to be a broad exclusion
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determined that the plan should not be excluded from the bankruptcy estate under applicable federal nonbankruptcy law.81

The court reasoned that the change in the scope of a bankruptcy
estate under the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history of section
541(c)(2), 82 the exemption provisions of section 522(d),83 and the
preemption provisions of ERISA84 indicated that Congress did not
intend the provisions of section 541 (c) (2) to include ERISA pension
fund benefits.85 The court ruled that Congress, in enacting section
541(c)(2), intended only to preserve the status held by spendthrift
7
trusts8 6 under the Bankruptcy Act.8

The Graham court also noted that pension benefits are specifically
treated under the Bankruptcy Code's exemption provision.8 8 Pension benefits are therefore intended and assumed to vest in the estate
when the petition is filed.89 Only to the extent they are needed for a
fresh start may pension benefits be exempted out.9 0 The court held,
however, that the pension proceeds at issue were not "property that
is exempt under federal law." 9 1
which would apply to keep all debtors' entire ERISA plan benefits out of the estate."
Id. at 1272.
81. Id. at 1274.
82. See id. at 1272; 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The court stated, "The Senate Report
...explained that § 541(c) (2) was intended to preserve restrictions on a transfer of
spendthrift trusts to the extent such trusts were valid under state law." Id.
83. See 726 F.2d at 1273-74; 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The court cited a list from the
House and Senate Reports of property which might be exempted under § 522(d). See
infra note 113. The court held that since the list did not specifically include ERISA
benefits, those benefits were not subject to the § 522(d) exemption provisions. 726
F.2d at 1274.
84. See 726 F.2d at 1273; I.R.C. § 1056(d). The court cited 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)
and concluded that "while ERISA-required anti-alienation clauses may preempt state
law and preclude the use of judgment enforcement devices provided thereunder,
they do not preclude inclusion of pension benefits in a debtor's bankruptcy estate by
operation of federal law." Id.
85. 726 F.2d at 1272-74.
86. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
88. See 726 F.2d at 1272. The court stated that "pension benefits are specifically
treated under the Code's exemption provision, clearly indicating that they were intended and assumed to be part of the estate." Id. (emphasis in original). The court
was referring to the exemption for pension plans provided by 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(d)(10)(E).
89. See 726 F.2d at 1272-73. "The question of pension rights is dealt with as a
matter of exemption. A debtor's interest in pension funds first comes into the bankruptcy estate. To the extent they are needed for a fresh start they may then be exempted out." Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (all property of the debtor vests immediately
in the estate upon filing of the petition).
90. 726 F.2d at 1273.
91. Id. The court stated, "ERISA specifically provides that its provisions were
not to affect the operation of other federal statutes: 'Nothing in this subchapter. ..
shall be construed to modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United
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The Graham court addressed two fundamental issues. First, the
court considered whether Graham's beneficial interest in the ERISA
pension fund was subject to a restriction on alienation enforceable
under nonbankruptcy law. 92 Second, the court considered whether
the pension plan's prohibition against assignment and alienation93
made Graham's interest in the plan exempt under federal law and,
94
therefore, exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
In holding that section 541 encompasses only traditional spendthrift trusts and not ERISA-qualifed plans, the court did not construe
section 541 on its face. Instead, the court deferred to the section's
legislative history.9 5 Graham argued that the plan's anti-alienation
clause 9 6 was a restriction on the transfer of his interest which was
enforceable against general creditors under nonbankruptcy law and,
therefore, against the bankruptcy trustee. 9 7 The court, however, rejected this argument despite previous case law indicating that ERISA
prohibited garnishment of benefits under a qualified plan by the general creditors of a plan beneficiary.9 8
The court held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in
section 541(c)(2) was not clear on its face. Consequently, it looked
to legislative history to interpret the statute's meaning.99 The court,
States .

.

. or any rule or regulation issued under law.' " Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.

§ 1144(d)).
92. 726 F.2d at 1270. The language phrasing the issue is derived from 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (c)(2), which provides: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." Id.
93. Such provisions are required for tax exempt qualification under ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a); I.R.C. § 401(a); see also supra
note 3.
94. 726 F.2d at 1273. The court's reference was to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A),
which provides:
(b) Notwithstanding § 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate...
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date
of the filing of the petition ....
Id.
95. See 726 F.2d at 1271-72.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) requires that an anti-alienation clause be contained in
the pension plan in order for it to qualify for tax benefits.
97. 726 F.2d at 1271.
98. See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1980) (antialienation provisions of ERISA preclude garnishment of fund benefits by general
commercial creditors of fund beneficiary); Commercial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (ERISA precludes garnishment
of plan benefits by commercial creditors).
99. Other courts have reached a different result on the issue of pension plan
includability in fact situations very similar to that in Graham. See, e.g., In re Pruitt, 30
Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) ("the language of § 541(c)(2) is clear on its
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however, found no indication that Congress intended section
541(c)(2) to exclude ERISA plan benefits from the estate since the
House and Senate Reports on the section referred only to spendthrift trusts.' 0 0
Similarly, the court rationalized that since pension benefits are
specifically mentioned under section 522,101 they are clearly intended and assumed to be a part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541.102 This fact, together with the recommendations which led
up to the enactment of section 522,103 led the court to conclude that
the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemptions04 included pension plans not
qualified under ERISA.105 The court held, however, that qualified
plans would certainly be included since Congress would not have
provided an exemption provision for ERISA benefits if those benefits
were never intended to be a part of the estate in the first place.106
In addressing the exemption issue under section 522, the Graham
court continued its analysis of the section 541 exclusion issue. The
question was whether the debtor was entitled to an exemption under
section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code.107 The debtor argued that because the plan prohibited alienation and assignment,108 his interest
in the plan was "property that is exempt under Federal law."1 09 The
court refined and restated this issue as whether the established ban
against garnishment of ERISA-qualified plans"0 under nonbanface and does not limit itself to spendthrift trusts"); see also Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982) ("under the plain and simple
language of § 541 (c)(2), if the ERISA anti-alienation provisions are enforceable
against general creditors, they are enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee").
100. See 726 F.2d at 1272-74; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176
(1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1978) (§ 541(c)(2) was intended to
continue exclusion of spendthrift trusts to the extent they are protected from creditors under applicable state law).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
102. 726 F.2d at 1272.
103. Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt
and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1975) (citing commission's note 8 to Pro-

posed Bankruptcy Act § 4-503; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 201, 207
(1969)).
104. See supra note 66.

105. 726 F.2d at 1272.
106. Id. at 1272-73.
107. See id. at 1273; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows the
debtor who is using the state exemption system to also exempt any property which is
exempt under federal law other than § 522(d).
108.

See supra note 75.

109. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
110. See Buha, 623 F.2d at 460-62 (anti-assignment and anti-alienation provisions
of ERISA plans must be read as including all encroachments both voluntary and involuntary and, therefore, plan benefits cannot be garnished by a creditor of a plan
beneficiary); CommercialMortgage, 526 F. Supp. at 516-18 (ERISA's assignment-alienation prohibition extends to involuntary assignments such as garnishments and cre-
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kruptcy law constituted an exemption under section 522(b)(2) (A).'",
To resolve the issue, the court again examined the Code's legislative history, which provided a list of property Congress intended to
exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A).'12 The court recognized that
the lists in the House and Senate Reports' 13 were not exclusive, but
reasoned that the failure of Congress to include ERISA in this list
indicated that ERISA benefits are not exempt under section
522(b) (2)(A)." t4
The court found a conceptual distinction between property considered exempt in the legislative history and that in an ERISA
plan.' 15 The conceptual distinction was evidenced by the fact that all
of the listed pension plans'16 were federal in nature," 1 7 while ERISA
regulates only private employer pension plans.'18 The court therefore held that ERISA was not federal law within the context of secates a general federal exemption of pension benefits from claims of commercial
creditors). The Graham court ruled that the Buha/CommercialMortgage bar on garnishment of ERISA plan benefits is not applicable in bankruptcy cases. See 726 F.2d at
1274.
111. The court stated, "The question before us is whether . . . [the
Buha/Commercial Mortgage] bar constitutes a § 522(b)(2)(A) federal exemption in a
bankruptcy proceeding." 726 F.2d at 1273.
112. See id. at 1273-74.
113. Id. at 1274. The court cited S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1978)
and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1977), which state that the nonexclusive list of exemptions includes: Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, Social Security payments, injury or death compensation payments from war
risk hazards, wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, civil service retirement
benefits, longshoremen's and harbor workers' benefits, Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, veterans' benefits, special pensions paid to the winners of the
Congressional Medal of Honor, and federal homestead lands on debts contracted
before issuance of the patent. 726 F.2d at 1274. The court also stated, "The legislative history provides no further indication of the intended scope of this provision."
Id.
114. The court declared, "While the above list was not meant to be exclusive, we
find the failure of Congress to include ERISA plan benefits probative of Congressional intent that ERISA was not a 'Federal law' upon which a § 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could be based." 726 F.2d at 1274.
115. The court acknowledged the similarity between ERISA and the other federal
pension plans, stating that "although the provisions of some of the statutes on the list
creating a federal exemption are similar to the anti-alienation provision of ERISA,
there is a conceptual distinction between the property exempted by the listed laws
and the property covered by ERISA." Id
116. This reference was to those plans and benefits which, according to the congressional reports, are specifically exempted under federal law.
117. The court stated, "The pensions, wages, benefits, and payments included in
the illustrative list are all peculiarly federal in nature, created by federal law or related to industries traditionally protected by the federal government." 726 F.2d at
1274.
118. Id.
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tion 522(b)(2)(A).119
III.

ERISA

PLANS AFTER GRAHAM

The Graham court retreated to the legislative histories of the relevant statutes to hold that the beneficial interest in the ERISA plan
should be neither excluded nor exempt from the bankruptcy estate.' 20 In so holding, however, the court may have "done an injustice to the plain meaning of the statute[s] and to the congressional
intent behind ERISA."121

The problem in ERISA plan bankruptcy cases arises when, as in
Graham, the pension plan does not constitute a valid spendthrift trust
under traditional state law. 1 22 The problem is exacerbated when the
pension plan is self-settled123 or easy access. 124 In Graham, the court
found that the statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code was ambiguous.' 2 5 Consequently, it relied on legislative history to determine that Congress intended to allow pension plans to be exempt
only if the plan was a spendthrift trust under state law. 126 The difficulty with the court's analysis is that it is not clear that Congress actually intended ERISA plans to fall within the bankruptcy estate.' 2 7
Graham indicates the current trend in the law. The circuit courts of
appeal, in the wake of the all-inclusive language of the Bankruptcy
Code, have disallowed pension plan exemptions or exclusions under
the Code. 128 Other federal courts have also disallowed such exemp119. See id. The court concluded "that Congress did not intend to include ERISA
plans within the other 'Federal law' exemption of § 522." Id.
120. See id. at 1271-74.
121. Pulles, supra note 3, at 19; see supra note 12.
122. See supra notes 56-57.
123. Pu~les, supra note 3, at 19. The term "self-settled" includes Keoghs, IRA
plans, and other systems in which the creator or settlor of the trust and the beneficiary are the same person.
124. Id. The term "easy access" refers to those trusts in which the beneficiary has
the power or ability to make withdrawals before his or her normal retirement age. Id.
125. See 726 F.2d 1271.
126. See Clotfelter, 24 Bankr. at 929 (term "spendthrift" as used in the legislative
reports should not be construed as a precise term of art, but rather as a more general
term which includes all similar plans and trusts).
127. See infra notes 148-49.
128. See, e.g., In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985) (ERISA-qualified
plans which were not spendthrift trusts under state law were not exempt under federal law, and thus passed to the bankruptcy estate); In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564
(Bankr. 7th Cir. 1984) (funds in pension plan offered by clinic which employed
debtor were not exempt, but were included in the bankruptcy estate); Clark v. O'Neill
(In re Clark), 711 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1983) (payments to debtor from Keogh account
not entitled to exemption since underlying purpose of the statute is to alleviate present rather than long-term need); Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (where ERISAqualified trusts were not spendthrift trusts they were not exempt); Regan v. Ross, 691
F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (providing that restriction on transfer of a beneficial interest
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tions and exclusions.129 Only a minority of courts have held to the
30

contrary. 1

of debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law was inapplicable notwithstanding state anti-assignment provision); Ryerson v. Ryerson (In re
Ryerson), 30 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (debtor's termination payment sufficiently rooted in prebankruptcy past and so little entangled in his ability to make a
fresh start that it was included in the estate).
129. See, e.g., Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 Bankr. 1002, 1005-06 (N.D. Ind.
1984) (ERISA plan held not to be a spendthrift trust and thus included in the bankruptcy estate); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v.
Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr. 893 (D.S.C. 1984) (despite anti-alienation
clauses, ERISA plan was not a spendthrift trust and was included in bankruptcy estate); Hovis v. Wright (In re Wright), 39 Bankr. 623 (D.S.C. 1983) (debtor's contributions to state retirement system were property of the estate under the Bankruptcy
Code); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984)
(debtor's vested interest in ERISA-qualified profit-sharing plan was property of the
estate); Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1984) (debtor's interest in qualified pension plan was included in bankruptcy
estate despite anti-alienation clauses in the plan); Nixon v. PJ. Pedone & Co. (In re
Nichols), 42 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (ERISA-qualified plan was held to be
a part of the bankruptcy estate); In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983)
(savings portion of ERISA plan not excluded from bankruptcy estate where debtor
had the present right to reach it at any time); In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1983) (interest in teacher's retirement savings account neither exempt nor excluded under the bankruptcy laws); In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983) (vested interest in a profit-sharing plan included despite spendthrift trust language contained in the plan); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza),
29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (corpus of ERISA plan not a spendthrift trust
where debtor could reach it at any time); Bass v. Shackelford (In re Shackelford), 27
Bankr. 372 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983) (funds deposited by debtor in individual retirement account not excluded); In re Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983)
(restrictions on transfer of Keogh plan not enforceable in bankruptcy proceeding);
Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (IRA included in
bankruptcy estate); In re Ross, 18 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982) (state law limiting ability of debtor to assign assets of pension fund does not preclude its inclusion
in the bankruptcy estate); In re Iler, 18 Bankr. 855 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1982) (funds held
by debtor's former employer pursuant to a deferred compensation plan were included in estate); In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (debtor's interest in qualified pension plan not exempt); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (where pension funds were not reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor they were included in estate).
130. See Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 927 (debtor's beneficial interest in ERISA-qualified
plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate); Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank (In re
Kwaak), 42 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (pension plan analogous to spendthrift
trust and thus excluded); Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr.
D.NJ. 1984) (Graham overlooks strong principle of state law preemption evidenced
by ERISA); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (interest in profit-sharing pension plan not included because plan contained anti-alienation language which precluded access by general creditors); Shults
v. Rose's Stores, Inc. (In re Holt), 32 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (funds
contributed toward debtor's pension fund excluded from the estate); In re Pruitt, 30
Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (debtor's interest in ERISA-qualified plan not
property of estate); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (where debtor
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The Graham court's holding that section 541(c)(2) allows ERISA
benefits to be included in the bankruptcy estate is difficult to reconcile with the statutory language. The court held that Congress would
not have provided an exemption under section 522(d)(10)(E)131 if it
had meant section 541132 to exclude pension benefits. I '3 Section
522(d)(10)(E), which exempts pension-type benefits from a wide
range of sources,' 3 4 is not inconsistent with section 541(c)(2), however. While the two statutes overlap, they are not inconsistent.135
The court also gave section 541(c)(2) an unnecessarily narrow
constructon. 13 6 The language of section 541(c) (2) is clear and does
not limit itself strictly to spendthrift trusts.13 7 Congress did not
could reach assets of ERISA-qualified plan only under certain conditions, none of
which had been met at the time of filing, his interest was not included); In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (pension benefits paid to debtor in lump
sum before filing of petition were reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and not included in the bankruptcy estate).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
132. Id. § 541(c)(2).
133. 726 F.2d at 1272. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra notes
101-06 and accompanying text.
134. See Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 930. The district court in Threewitt stated that:
Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts the right to receive payments necessary for
support from a wide range of sources, tax qualified or not, including, for example, Christmas stock bonuses paid upon 25 years of service, or profit-sharing
plans restricted to senior employees, or an annuity purchased to provide
income to a worker disabled in an industrial accident.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
135. See Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 331-32. The Pruitt court held that:
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) is not inconsistent with Section 541(c)(2) ...
Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts ERISA plans as well as many other types of
support payments. As stated by the court in In re Threewitt. . . there may be
an overlap between 541 (c)(2) and 522(d) (10)(E) in that the former excludes
ERISA plans from property of the estate and the latter provides an exemption for them but that overlap does not constitute an inconsistency.
Id. The Threewitt court summed up its discussion of the overlap of the two sections by
succinctly proclaiming that it did "not consider it remarkable that Congress did not
bother to further complicate an already complex code by taking pains to insure that
there was no overlap between Section 522(d)(10)(E) and Section 541(c)(2)."
Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 930.
136. Section 541(c) (2) seems clear on its face. Both the Pruitt and Threewitt courts
concluded that it is. See Pruitt, 30 Bankr. at 331; Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929; see also
Pulles, supra note 3, at 19. One would think that the application of this section to a
plan involving ERISA-qualifying anti-alienation provisions would be a simple task.
Id. The question would be: outside of bankruptcy, would a court give legal effect to
the anti-alienation clause of the plan? If the answer were yes, the fund would not be
part of the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). Pulles, supra note 3, at 19.
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (an interest of the debtor in property becomes
property of the estate, but a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title"). In Pruitt, the court asserted, "The language of Section
541 (c)(2) is clear on its face and does not limit itself to spendthrift trusts. When a
statute is clear on its face there is no need to resort to legislative history." 30 Bankr.
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choose to use the term "spendthrift trust" in the language of the
t 8 It is unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that the
statute itself.1
term, as used in the legislative history, should be interpreted as a
term of art.' 3 9 It is more logical that the term "spendthrift trust"
should be given its more ordinary and general meaning.140
at 331; see United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1984) (statute should be interpreted
to foster the purpose of the legislation and should not be extended to cover matters
not specifically covered). One court has held that the bankruptcy laws are to be liberally construed in favor of bankrupt parties. See Spies v. Sytsma, 56 F.2d 520, 522 (8th
Cir. 1932) (bankruptcy statutes should be liberally construed in the debtor's favor).
Although Spies was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, prior precedents remain influential under the Code. See supra note 19.
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The only mention of spendthrift trusts was in the
House and Senate Reports, see supra note 100, and also in the Bankruptcy Commission Report to Congress. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 193
(1973). The commission was established in 1970 to study the bankruptcy laws and
make recommendations to Congress. The report was given in two parts. Part I contains the recommendations of the commission on improving the bankruptcy laws of
the United States, while part II consists of this proposed statute and explanatory
notes. Id. at 1-1. Interestingly enough, the commission's proposal for what was to
become § 541 (c)(2) did not contain the term spendthrift trust. That proposal read as
follows:
(b) Invalidity of Certain Restrictions and Forefeitures [sic]. Any prohibition
on the transfer of property by the debtor and any provision for forfeiture or
termination condition on the filing of a petition are unenforceable as to
property of the estate, but a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust created for his support which is enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law shall be enforceable against the trustee
only to the extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and his dependents.
Id. pt. II, at 147-48. The commission made reference to spendthrift trusts only in its
recommendations and in the comments to the proposed statute. The recommendations stated that "the Commission recommends that any prohibition on the transfer
of property by the debtor and any provision for forfeiture or termination as a result
of the filing of a petition be unenforceable as to property of the estate, except as qualified in the case of spendthrift trusts." Id. pt. I, at 193 (emphasis added). The comment to
proposed § 541(c)(2), however, states, "[proposed § 541 (c)(2)] creates an exception
as to spendthrift and support trusts. The beneficial interest of the debtor in income andprincipal
needed to support the debtor and his dependents is not availablefor creditors." Id. pt. II, at 151
(emphasis added). It cannot, therefore, be categorically stated that the commission,
and subsequently Congress, intended § 541 (c)(2) to include only spendthrift trusts.
139. See Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929.
140. The Threewitt court declared that:
Since Congress did not choose to use the term 'spendthrift trust' in the language of the section itself, there is no reason to suppose that when the term
appears in the legislative history it should be taken as a term of art; it is
more reasonable to suppose that the term should be given its ordinary,
more general meaning as 'inclusive of all trusts which bar creditors from
reaching a beneficiary's interest.'
Id. (citing 76 AM.JuR. 2D Trusts § 148, at 389 (1975)); cf Millhouse v. Swan Lumber
Co. (In re Sims Bros. Builders, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 149, 151 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)
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The important issue is not whether the pension plan has the characteristics of a traditional spendthrift trust, but whether the debtor's
interest in it would be protected against general creditors.141 This
conclusion is supported by the weight of authority holding that ERISA assets cannot be reached by ordinary creditors.142 If the antialienation and assignment provisions of a pension plan are enforceable against creditors, the plain language of section 541 (c) (2) dictates
1 43
that they are also enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee.
The Graham court also failed to address a question which bankruptcy courts have addressed in dealing with the exemption issue.144
The Eighth Circuit assumed that ERISA creates a bar to garnishment
(fundamental canon of statutory construction is that words are to be given their ordinary, commonly understood meaning); Noggle v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (In re Noggle),
30 Bankr. 303 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (a fundamental canon of statutory construction is that unless otherwise defined, words should be given their ordinary meaning).
141. Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929; see Pruitt,30 Bankr. 331; Pulles, supra note 3, at 19.
142. See Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929; see also General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623
F.2d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980) (pension plans not subject to garnishment); Commercial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
("ERISA's assignment-alienation prohibition creates a general federal exemption of
pension benefits from commercial creditors' claims and preempts otherwise relevant
state law"); cf. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d
1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (ERISA anti-alientation provisions extended to vacation
trusts).
143. See Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929. The Threewitt court held that since the ERISA
plan was beyond the reach of general creditors, "it accordingly follows, by virtue of
Section 541 (c)(2), that the bankruptcy trustee may not reach [the debtor's] interest in
the [ERISA] plan." Id.; cf. Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 190-91. In Mosley, the court disagreed
with the conclusion of CommercialMortgage that the anti-alienation provision of ERISA
creates a per se exemption for every qualified pension plan. Nevertheless, the court
determined that the ERISA-qualified plan involved in that case was exempt from general creditors and was therefore excluded by virtue of the "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" language of § 541(c)(2). Id.
144. One court has stated the issue as "whether [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)] was meant
to create a federal exemption for all pension plans governed by ERISA." Mosley, 42
Bankr. at 188. Section 1056(d) merely requires that the pension plan must state that
the benefits stemming from it may not be assigned or alienated. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d);
see I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (trust qualified only if plan provides that benefits may not be
assigned or alienated). These statutes require only that the language be contained in
the plan for qualification under ERISA. This has led to a division in the courts as to
whether ERISA actually creates a federal exemption or merely requires the antialienation language and leaves the question of plan exemption up to state law. See
Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 188-89; see also Comment, Attachment of Pension Benefits Under ER-

ISA, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 255 (1979). The bankruptcy court in Graham addressed this
argument and explained:
In [5 U.S.C. § 8346] Congress directly exempted the Civil Service Benefits
from creditors. In contrast, ERISA only requires that the plan contain a
restriction on alienation and assignment in order to qualify for ERISA tax
benefits. That requirement is not an exemption from creditors' process provided by federal law. If Congress has intended that ERISA would provide
such an exemption, a provision similar to [5 U.S.C. § 8346] could have been
enacted. The fact that they did not do so leads this Court to conclude that
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of qualified plan benefits by general creditors of a beneficiary.145
The bankruptcy court, however, held that since ERISA does not specifically preclude garnishment creditors,146 it does not create an exemption from creditors' process provided by federal law.147 Both
the analysis by the bankruptcy court and the subsequent summary
affirmation of this point by the Eighth Circuit overlook the policy
behind ERISA.148 ERISA was intended to make pension regulation
more uniform by removing state regulatory power and establishing
ERISA fund regulation as a strictly federal concern.14 9 It is illogical

to assume that Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, intended
an ERISA fund is not within the exemption from the bankruptcy estate provided by other federal law under § 522(b)(2)(A).
24 Bankr. at 312.
145. See 726 F.2d at 1273; see also Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 188. The Mosley court noted
that "although the Bankruptcy Court opinion in In re Graham was affirmed, the Court
of Appeals assumed without analysis that ERISA section 206(d) and I.R.C. section
401 (a) (13) 'create a bar to garnishment of qualified plan benefits by general commercial creditors of a beneficiary ....
' " Id. at 188-89.
146. The provisions of ERISA require only that the pension plans provide for the
anti-alienation and assignment language itself, not that the plan be specifically
unalienable and unassignable under federal law.
147. See 24 Bankr. at 312.
148. See In re Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 189. The Mosley court held:
If Congress had intended to subject all pensions to the various exemption
provisions of the states in spite of the clear preemption provisions providing
that ERISA 'supersede(s) any and all State laws insofar as they may not or
hereafter relate to' pensions, the statute would surely have done so explicitly. Indeed, ERISA does explicitly preserve state regulation of 'insurance,
banking or securities,' 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(b)(2)(A), and 'generally applicable criminal law(s) of a state,' Section 1144(b)(2)(B)(4), but does not
mention either exemption or attachment laws of the states. The anti-alienation provision of ERISA was thus intended to create a federal exemption for
pensions.
Id at 189; see also text accompanying note 121, supra.
149. Subchapter I of ERISA provides that ERISA "supersede[s] any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" that is
ERISA-qualified. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). That same statute provides, however, that no
part of ERISA should be construed as superseding or amending any law of the
United States. 11 U.S.C. § 1144(d). Applicable federal law, not state nonbankruptcy
law, controls whether the restrictions in the plans are applicable. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977); see Holt, 32 Bankr. at 770. Senator Williams, a
member of the Senate committee responsible for the ERISA legislation, stated that it
was intended that a body of federal common law be developed to determine the
rights and obligations stemming from ERISA private pension plans. See 120 CONG.
REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams). The court stated that the House
Ways and Means Committee Report supports the conclusion that general creditors
should not be able to reach ERISA pension assets. 32 Bankr. at 771-72. The Committee Report states: "Alienation.-To further ensure that the employee's accrued
benefits are actually available for retirement purposes, the committee bill also contains a provision requiring the plan to provide that benefits may not be assigned or
alienated." H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974).
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to resume reliance on state law150 when one of the main policy
objectives behind ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code was to avoid reli15
ance on state statutes. '
The court's determination that ERISA was not another applicable
federal law'5 2 for the purposes of section 522(b)(2)(A) is also not
well-reasoned. The legislative history clearly indicates that the list of
possible exemptions under federal law is not meant to be exclusive.153 The court specifically noted that no further indications of
legislative intent were given other than the non-exclusive list mentioned by Congress.' 5 4 A more careful analysis, however, reveals
other indications of legislative intent in the House and Senate Reports.' 55 It is questionable whether Congress intended to exclude
ERISA pension plans entirely from section 522(b)(2)(A)156 or simply
intended to allow the trustee to receive the excess over that which is
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his
dependents. 157
The court's conceptual distinction between the listed congres150. For example, it is illogical to assume that Congress intended to use state
spendthrift trust law to determine whether the pension plan passes to the estate. See,
e.g., Miller v. Jones (In reJones), 43 Bankr. 1002 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (ERISA plan assets
did Pass to the bankruptcy estate because plan did not qualify as spendthrift trust
under state law).
151. As described in Mosley, the ERISA legislation was intended to do away with
all reliance on state regulation of qualified private pension plans. The enactment of
the new method of determining the property of the estate in § 541 was intended to
reduce the reliance of bankruptcy law on state law. See In re Wildman, 30 Bankr. 133
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (one of the dominant purposes behind the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was to place within a single court the authority to determine all
aspects of a bankruptcy case).
152. 726 F.2d at 1274.
153. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1978) (debtor may choose
between federal exemptions or exemptions provided under other federal law or the
law of his or her domicile state).
154. See 726 F.2d at 1274. The court stated, "The legislative history provides no
further indication of the intended scope of this provision." Id.
155. The notes to the proposed statute made by the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws state:
The value of property exempted by [§ 522(b)(2)(A)] is not limited. Benefits
or rights under a retirement plan are exempt under [§ 522(b)(2)(A)] if the
plan is qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a). A limit is placed on the exemption
since it is recognized that members of professional corporations and officers
will have very substantial benefits. The exemption is limited to benefits 'reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents.' This
treatment is similar to that accorded interests in spendthrift trusts by [§ 541]
of the proposed Act.
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 129 (1973).
156. The Graham court held that ERISA was not appropriate for a § 522(b)(2)(A)
exemption. See 726 F.2d at 1274.
157. See, e.g., Goff, 706 F.2d 574.
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sional exemptions and ERISA is tenuous.15 8 The court should have
examined the intent behind the federal pension plans listed by Congress in determing whether ERISA was conceptually distinguishable.
All the listed plans are "peculiarly federal in nature," as the court
indicated.' 5 9 The plans themselves, however, are meant to provide
the same type of old age security as ERISA. ERISA does "regulate
private employer pension systems" as Graham suggests.' 6 0 But, the
conceptual difference between pension provisions which support
federal workers or workers in federally protected industries,' 6 ' and
provisions which were enacted to ensure that workers in private industry have pension plans is difficult to understand in light of the
policies behind ERISA.162
CONCLUSION

The Graham court was concerned with the potential abuse of ERISA pension plans1 63 and the bankruptcy statutes.t64 While the
court may limit the scope of Graham to similar fact situations involving self-settled, easy-access funds, its holding may have done an injustice to the plain meaning of the statute and the policies behind
65
ERISA and the bankruptcy laws.'
Congress has concluded through the enactment of ERISA that
these types of pension plans are an asset to society.16 6 It has also
established, through the use of restrictive language, that ERISA regulates private pension plans.167 Under Graham, however, when a
debtor with an ERISA plan files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy
68
Code and not ERISA becomes the controlling statute.'
The result in Graham may not have been inequitable based upon
the facts of the case. The court's ruling could, however, inspire inequitable holdings when other courts follow its precedent. Other
courts have resolved the issues presented here in a much more equi158. See 726 F.2d at 1274.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court concluded that Congress did not intend to include ERISA
plans within the other federal law exemption of § 522. Id.
161. The reference is to the exempt interests cited in the legislative reports. See
supra note 63.
162. See supra notes 149-51.
163. See Pulles, supra note 3, at 22.
164. See supra note 58 (referring to Congress' concern over conditional transfers).
165. Pulles, supra note 3, at 19.
166. By establishing the tax advantages for ERISA-qualified plans, Congress has
indicated that it wants to encourage participation in these plans and that they are
advantageous to our society and economy. See supra note 5.
167. See Pulles, supra note 3, at 24.
168. See id. (court's interpretation of bankruptcy law as controlling over ERISA
makes Bankruptcy Code controlling statute for private pension plans rather than
ERISA).
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table manner.1 6 9 The Eighth Circuit, even if it was not disposed to
hold in favor of this particular debtor, should have indicated that its
decision was limited to the specific facts of the case.
169. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (cases excluding pension benefits
from estate).
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